This paper studies the valuation of companies going public in Europe. We find that most of the IPOs in the period 1995-2001 were valued by underwriters using the Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) model and/or the multiples approach. We propose a methodology to infer the growth rates implied in offer prices. Reverse-engineering DCF valuations, we back out implied growth rates of free cash flow over five years. We find that forecasted cash flows are higher than actual realizations. By comparing the IPO prices to the fair values obtained substituting the actual ex-post cash flows in the DCF model, we find that the median IPO firm is overvalued at the offering by 74%. The cross-sectional determinants of such forecast errors are market-to-book ratio, leverage at the IPO, net earnings, underpricing, and firm's age and size (these latter negatively related). We also find evidence of a negative market reaction to post-IPO disclosure of cash flows lower than expectations.
Introduction
When going public, firms are faced with the difficult decision of how to determine the offer price for their shares. This is a question of considerable practical and theoretical importance for both investors and academics. However, despite considerable research efforts, IPO valuations are still largely mysterious. This paper challenges this research gap.
There exist two broad approaches in the valuation literature. The first is a direct valuation approach, in which firm value is estimated directly from its fundamentals; and the second is a relative valuation approach, in which firm value is estimated indirectly by reference to the prices of comparable firms. In both the approaches, the valuation of firms going public poses specific difficulties related to the IPO timing decision. First, firms may time their IPO, in order to take advantage of "windows of opportunities". These are periods of market buoyancy during which companies have an incentive to issue new shares on the base of an over-valuation of other companies in their industry (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) . This will yield to investors the risk of over-valuation of the firms priced using relative valuation methodologies. Besides, firms may decide to go public when they are able to display positive growth opportunities, and thus induce optimistic valuations. To do this, firms may time their IPO for when transitory earnings are high, since investors have difficulty distinguishing between transitory and permanent earnings (signaljamming explanation as in Stein, 1989) . Managers may also window-dress their accounting numbers to make the firms look better before public offering (Teoh et al., 1998 ). This will yield to investors the risk of over-valuation of the firms priced using direct valuation methodologies.
Since the seminal paper on valuing IPOs by Kim and Ritter (1999) , a few recent papers have investigated the use of multiples of comparable firms to value IPOs (e.g. Berkman et al., 2000; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Jagannathan and Gao, 2005) . These studies use value estimations produced by researchers to test the accuracy of valuations and typically find that IPO firms are overvalued at offer prices relative to their comparables.
We take a different perspective and examine the accuracy of 'real world' valuation models, as used by investment banks in Continental Europe. This research setting is unique because information on valuation assumptions and cash flow forecasts of US IPO firms are generally unavailable in SEC documents. US underwriters are indeed prohibited from publishing opinions concerning valuation before listing 1 . On the contrary, some information on the valuation estimates is frequently disclosed in IPO prospectuses of firms going public in Continental Europe. This difference may be due to a different role of investment banks involved in the IPO process as compared to the US. The difficulties in valuing IPOs leave a great responsibility to investment bank, that in this way are subject to reputation incentives. If the firm is undervalued, its existing shareholders do not appreciate to "leave money on the table"; if the firm is overvalued, the investors will be displeased and cautious in subscribing to future IPOs underwritten by the same investment banks. Since underwriters repeatedly bring firms public, they have strong incentives to build a reputation (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995) . However, if the number of firms going public on a market each year is small, or if the financial analysts' industry is not well-developed, reputation-based incentives for underwriters may be imperfect. In these situations, since disperse investors cannot make direct contact with issuers, the latter have to publicly convey information that can be used to value their shares. This may help reduce information asymmetries between managers and public investors and insists on the need to make explicit in IPO prospectuses the valuation metrics used for pricing.
Hence, the level of disclosure of valuation information for IPOs is higher in Continental
Europe compared to the US. Prior studies accessing to these information typically report that underwriters frequently use two or more valuation methods and that the DCF model and multiples are the most widely used methodologies 2 . We carefully read the prospectuses and pre-IPO reports of the 342 non-financial firms that went public in the period 1995-2001 in France (Euronext Paris), Germany (Deutsche Börse) and Italy (Borsa Italiana), excluding new markets. We find that underwriters determine an initial price range for the shares using traditional valuation techniques such as the discounted cash flow (DCF) method or the comparable multiples method. Most of the IPOs were priced using both the DCF model and the peer group multiples valuation. Although IPO prospectuses often specify the comparables selected for valuation, they provide only limited information about the DCF model. We are able to investigate a sample of 184 IPOs priced by investment banks using the DCF model. We use this sample to address a basic research question, that is: at what rate is an IPO firm expected to grow?
To answer, we derive an estimation procedure which infers cash flow growth rates implied in IPO prices. Precisely, we reverse-engineer the DCF model to back out implied growth rates of free cash flow over five years. We find that the market attaches a high growth expectation to IPO firms. Cash flows of the "average" IPO firm are indeed expected to growth by 33% annually.
Unfortunately, ex-post realizations do not meet such ex ante targets, as we find only slightly positive actual post-IPO growth rates. We compare IPO prices with fair value estimates obtained by 2 We are aware of only three other papers doing so. Cassia et al. (2004) investigate how underwriters value the stocks of companies they bring public in Italy, Roosenboom (2007) in France, and Deloof et al. (2007) in Belgium.
using the same assumption of our reverse-DCF model with actual ex-post cash flows and find that the median IPO firm is overvalued at the offering by 74%.
Finally, we perform a regression analysis to identify the cross-sectional determinants of forecast errors, measured as the percent difference between actual vs forecasted cash flows. Upward bias in analysts' forecasts appears determined by (1) market-to-book ratio, (2) leverage at the IPO, (3) net earnings, (4) firm's age at the IPO (negatively related), (5) firm's size at the IPO (negatively related), and (6) underpricing. We also investigate whether forecast errors are associated with longterm stock returns and find that errors in cash flows forecasts are a determinant of the aftermarket stock performance. There is indeed a negative reaction of the market to the disclosure of cash flows lower than expected. An intuitive explanation for this is that, subsequent to listing, investors will be constantly evaluating how accurate were the forecasts and they will revise their price expectations accordingly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. The methodology is described in Section 3 and the sample in Section 4. Section 5 compares estimates with actual realizations. Section 6 investigates the determinants of forecast errors, while Section 7 studies their relationships with stock market returns. Conclusions are discussed in Section 8.
Literature review
This study brings together diverse streams of literature in accounting and finance. First, our work aims to extend prior studies on the pricing of IPOs. This field of investigation is opened by Kim and Ritter (1999) that examine the use of multiples of comparable firms to value US IPOs.
Considering both historical accounting numbers and forecasted earnings, they find that price- Dealing with the pricing of IPOs, our study is also related to the literature studying the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Several studies in this stream have found that analysts tend to be overoptimistic and that their forecasts systematically exceed the actual figures (see Derrien (2007) for a review). In particular, the pressure on analysts to produce favourable reports on IPO firms, both before and after the offering, is well documented and has attracted considerable regulatory attention. Several papers examine analysts' forecasts for IPO firms finding that analysts are overly optimistic in their forecasts of firms' prospects. The extant literature generally compares the ex-ante expectations to actual ex-post realizations of absolute performance measures such as earnings. Our study employs this methodology to compare actual to forecasted cash flows, with the latter estimated using growth rates implied in IPO prices. The estimation of the short term implied growth rate is in the spirit of accounting studies that invert the Residual Income Model (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995) . Our study is therefore also related to this recent line of research in the accounting literature that reverse-engineers valuation models to obtain estimates of the expected rate of return on equity investment 3 .
Methodology

The DCF model
The challenge of using accounting numbers for valuation purposes has tempted financial accounting researchers and professional financial analysts over the years. The value of a business is based on its future prospects so it is understandable that valuation models that involve forecasts have considerable currency. The starting point of direct methodologies is indeed the statement that to value firms, analysts have to forecast their payoffs. In particular, the choice and measurement of suitable accounting numbers constitutes important issues in the financial accounting literature.
Among the most important valuation models, DCF and RIM offer alternative specifications. The latter has recently gained much attention in the academic literature. The underlying value attribute of this model is the definition of Residual Income, as follows. In the income statement, the cost of the debt financing is listed in the form of interest payments, but there is no charge for the equity invested in the company. The RIM specifies an explicit charge for equity, and subtracts it from the net income to define the Residual Income. The present value of the Residual Income numbers is added to the book value of equity to arrive at an equity valuation.
Although RIM is attracting considerable attention, there is no evidence of its use by underwriters in the pricing of European IPOs, while DCF is adopted in most of the IPOs (Cassia et al., 2004; Roosenboom, 2007 Deloof et al., 2007 terminating the business in the near-term, the assumption of on-going concern will require estimating the value of the future cash flows for an indefinite period (Equation 1).
In practice, like other direct valuation models, DCF typically proceeds in two periods. 
Equation (2) 4 DCF can be implemented from two distinct perspectives: that of shareholders (equity side or equity DCF) or that of the firm (assets side or enterprise DCF). The most diffused perspective is the latter, which refers to the Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FFCF), defined as residual cash flows after deducting the operating costs and taxes, but not the debt interests. FFCF are discounted at a discount rate that reflects the firm's degree of business risk. Since a firm can be seen as a set of assets, partly financed with equity and partly with debt, the total cost of the capital is often calculated as the weighted average of the cost of the two types of funding (Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC). The usual hypothesis is that the firm's financial structure can be considered constant and that the cost of the capital does not change in the future; in this case it follows that the WACC can be considered constant in time. A detailed description of the valuation techniques can be found in text books such as Penman (2001) and Damodaran (2006) . 
Equation (3) In this way, the Enterprise Value at time t (EV t ) is expressed as a function of five 
Reverse-engineering the DCF model
The DCF formula (Equation 4) is applied to value IPO firms. In this study, we invert the DCF model to obtain an estimate of the expected growth rates implied in the IPO prices. To some extent, our approach is similar to the estimation of the internal rate of return on a bond using market values and coupon payments. Using this methodology, we estimate the expected growth rate of the cash flows, as implied in offer prices. Obviously, there would be many firm-specific factors to consider when attempting to forecast such growth rates. However, a simple two-stage model allows us to estimate an indicative short-run growth rates implied in the offer prices.
We use the known FCFF prior to the IPO to estimate post-IPO cash flows (FCFF t ≡ FCFF IPO ). FCFFs are therefore estimated simply by applying growth rates to the pre-IPO cash flow. In particular, FCFFs are expected to growth annually by a short-term rate (g 1 ) in the first-stage of extra-growth immediately after the IPO (from the year of IPO to T years later), whereas in the second long-term period, FCFFs are expected to growth at (lower) steady-state growth rate (g 2 ). is the offer price (P IPO ) times the number of newly issued shares offered (NSH new ). Hence, the offer price (P IPO ) can be expressed as the difference between Enterprise and Debt value at IPO (EV IPO -D IPO ), scaled by the number of shares outstanding before the IPO (Equation 6).
Under these assumptions, the Enterprise Value at the IPO (EV
Equation (6) If we assume that the Enterprise Value at IPO is estimated with the Enterprise DCF model, the offer price can be calculated substituting the Enterprise Value as expressed in Equation (5) in Equation (6). We obtain our final model in Equation (7). (7) We use this model to reverse-engineer the DCF model in order to derive growth rates implied in IPO prices. Given the IPO market value of a firm, we use the FCFF prior to the IPO (FCFF IPO ), the long-term growth rate (g 2 ) and expected cost of capital (WACC) to obtain the unknown short-term extra-growth rate (g 1 ) implicit in the offer price (Equation 7).
As IPO firms are often young and with limited accounting information, we expect that the market will attach high growth expectations to these firms. We are therefore interested in the short term, as this is the period during which the IPO firms are expected to extra-grow on the base of a competitive advantage. In other words, the growth rate that is applied to truncated payoffs must be high when the value of firm is not justified by its accounting fundamentals, as it is often the case of firms at the IPO 5 .
In our model (Equation 7), the unknown parameter (g 1 ) is estimated at firm-specific level as a function of seven other variables. Assumptions for these variables are as follows 6 .
(1) p IPO (firm-specific). Offer price.
(2) NSH pre (firm-specific). Number of existing shares prior to the IPO, as reported in the prospectus.
(3) FCFF IPO (firm-specific). Free Cash Flow to the Firm prior to the IPO, as reported in the prospectus (residual cash flows after deducting the operating costs and taxes, but not the debt interests).
(4) D IPO (firm-specific). Debt outstanding at the IPO, as reported in the prospectus.
(5) WACC (firm-specific). Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is computed as: 250-days betas using firm's daily stock returns relative to the market index. The promised return on debt is computed as follows:
The spread Δ is defined for each firm according to S&P risk class, based on the ratio between operating profit and interest expenses, using conversion tables by Damodaran (2006) . The corporate tax rate t C is the statutory corporate income tax rate for resident companies as reported in the "Corporate Tax Rate Survey" by KPMG and refers to the country of the company headquarter. In alternative, the estimates do not vary significantly using tax rates obtained from the "Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide", published yearly by Ernst&Young.
(6) T (constant). The first period of the DCF typically involves a five year forecast, before the continuing value.
(7) g 2 (constant). The long-term growth rate is assumed equal to 2.5%, that is approximately the historical growth rate in real gross domestic product in Europe 8 .
Sample
Sample selection
The sample is made of recent European IPOs priced using the DCF model. The list of IPOs is from the EURIPO database that covers all the IPOs taking place in Europe since 1985 9 . We apply 7 Beta are estimated for the first 250 days of trading after the IPO (excluding the first 21 trading days after the IPO date to avoid a potential bias from the price stabilization of underwriters during that period). These estimates use post-IPO information. We estimated the betas also using ex-ante information (i.e. industry betas for the months prior to the IPO), however the results do not vary appreciably. 8 The correct value of a firm's stock can be computed by capitalizing nominal cash flows at a nominal rate, or real cash flows at a real rate. Assuming for the second stage of the DCF (infinite horizon) a constant discount rate, inflation rate, and real growth rate, these two methods are equivalent. During periods of inflation, the nominal cost of equity is higher by virtue of higher inflation. However, the nominal growth rate will also be higher -and, consequently, inflations' effect on the real value of the stock will be neutral. As pointed out by Ritter and Warr (2002) , misevaluation will occur if investors use a nominal discount rate but fail to incorporate a higher nominal growth rate into their valuations. In our model, the WACC is a nominal amount, so conceptually we are discounting the future more, the higher is expected inflation. However, since inflation is not changing much during our sample period, results are not significantly affected. As mentioned in footnote 5, IPO firms cannot be expected to outperform in the long term, as they will become mature and will normalize their growth rates to that of their competitors. As a consequence, it is not possible a priori to assume higher steady-state perpetual growth rate (g 2 ) for a particular company or a particular industry (Mauboussin and Johnson, 1997; Damodaran, 2006 Further filters are applied in order to build an ad-hoc sample of IPOs to test our reverse-DCF model. In particular, we select IPO-firms that respect these three additional restrictions.
(1) The DCF was among the valuation methods used for their pricing (205 IPOs) 10 .
(2) Their pre-IPO FCFF was positive 11 (loosing 11 IPOs).
(3) Cash flows are available up to five years after the IPO (loosing other 10 IPOs).
The final sample results in 184 IPOs 12 . For these firms, we invert the DCF model (using pre-IPO cash flow, equity book value and debt outstanding) to obtain an estimate of the expected growth rate implied in their offer price.
Sample description
We find that underwriters determine an initial price range for the shares using traditional valuation techniques such as the discounted cash flow (DCF) method or the comparable multiples method 13 . The valuation process of a typical IPO involves the underwriter using both the DCF and the multiples approach and combining the value estimates to determine their fair value estimate of the IPO firm's equity (Table 1) . Indeed, most of the IPOs were priced using both the DCF model and the peer group multiples valuation (this is the case of 166 IPOs, out of 252 where we could find information on the valuation technique used by underwriters). In particular, 213 IPOs were priced using peer group multiples valuation (213-166= 47 IPOs used only the multiples approach) and 205 using the DCF (205-166= 39 IPOs used only the DCF).
9 EURIPO is a database on European and American IPOs managed by Universoft, spin-off company of the University of Bergamo (www.euripo.eu). 10 The valuation process of a typical IPO involves the underwriter using one or more valuation methods and combining the value estimates of these different methods into a composite valuation. This paper focuses on the assumptions implied in the IPO pricing through the DCF model. 11 Growth rate of a negative number does not make intuitive sense 12 The sample drops by only 10% (from 205 to 184 IPOs) after applying the filters requiring positive pre-IPO cash flow and availability of cash flows for the 5 years following the IPOs. We therefore do not believe that our sample is significantly affected by survivorship bias. 13 Other methodologies such as DDM and EVA are also mentioned, but only in a minority of cases. To test for possible sample biases, in Table 2 we compare the EURIPO sample of 342 IPOs to our final sample of 184 IPOs and find little significant differences 14 . Sample firms are in median 17 years old at IPO. Median sales are 39 €m and median market value at IPO is 96 €m. As for offer characteristics, the median size of the IPOs is 23 €m, with shares sold by existing shareholders (secondary offer) being 10% of the pre-IPO shares outstanding. The number of newly issued shares (primary offer) over the pre-IPO shares is in median 16%. The offer price is typically lower then the first-day price (median underpricing 3.7%) and higher than the Preliminary Offer Price (median book-building partial adjustment 3.6%) 15 .
[ Table 2 reports the mean and median values of several variables (see the appendix for notation and variable definition) and compares our sample of 184 IPOs with the initial EURIPO sample of 342 IPOs. Tests on the differences (Mann-Whitney U-test of equal medians, and t-tests of equal mean) show that there was no substantial sampling bias due to the filters applied. Indeed, we did not find any statistical difference over 5%. 15 Preliminary Offer Prices (POP) are measured as the midpoint of the book-building price range. Partial adjustment is per cent difference between offer price and the midpoint of the book-building range.
Implied growth rates, overconfidence and forecast errors.
We estimate at what rate an IPO firm is expected to grow. To do this, we reverse-engineer the DCF model using IPO prices and other variables using the model expressed in Equation (7).
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of our estimation. We find that the "average" IPO firm is expected to grow at 33.8% annual rate in its first five years as a public company 16 .
We compare these expected FCFF to actual cash flow growth rates (CAGR). For each firm j, Equation (9) In light of analysts' tendency to be optimistic, estimates of the expected rate of return implied in IPO prices are likely to generally be higher than actual realizations. Results are confirmative (Panel B of Table 3 ). The median values of Cumulated Average Growth Rates (CAGR) of FCFF are negative in the first years after the IPO. In particular, the CAGR for the first year is in median less than -100%. This means that most of the companies in our sample, although with positive FCFF prior to the IPO (this is a selection criterion), shows a negative FCFF the following year. This evidence may be due to engagement in high investment activities after listing or to market timing motivations to go public (i.e. signal-jamming or window-dress hypotheses).
Cash flows recoup as time passes, with positive median CAGR five years after the IPO. However, even at this time, actual growth rates are much lower than expected (1.8% vs 21.4% implied in offer prices). Table 3 gives details on Forecast Errors (FE) estimated as in Equation (9). We find median FEs of 99.6% three years after the IPO, and 85.5% at five years 17 . There seems 16 Averages are 38.1% if referring to first-day prices rather than offer prices, 33.1% to preliminary offer prices. Estimations using the first-day prices yield higher results due to the underpricing phenomenon (offer price typically lower then firs-day price), while estimations with preliminary offer prices yield to lower results, due to the partial adjustment phenomenon (offer price typically higher than preliminary offer price). See Table 2 . Median values of growth rates are lower than averages (between 19% and 22%) . 17 We do not report FE one year after the IPO as most of FCFF 1 are negative.
Panel C of
therefore to be evidence of over-optimism in the assumptions of the DCF model used to value IPOs.
We further investigate this issue by comparing IPO prices (p IPO ) with fair value estimates. We define the fair value of a company at the IPO (v IPO ) by using the same assumptions of our reverse-DCF model with actual ex-post cash flows. In other words, we apply the same DCF model, this time not only conditional on information available at the time of the IPO, but also using ex-post realizations (actual FCFF) for five years after the IPO. With the same long-term hypothesis applied to the reverse-DCF model, we infer the fair value of IPO firms using actual post-issue (rather than estimated) cash flows (Equation 10). Table 4 provides the breakdown of the estimates of implied growth rates by year of listing, industry, and stock exchange. Table 5 reports the results of a sensitivity analysis for the variables, whose variation has the greatest impact on g 1 estimates, namely the long-term variable g 2 and the length of the DCF first-stage T. Assuming higher long-term growth rates (g 2 ), of course, downsize our short terms estimates (g 1 ). However, the rationale of our analysis does not change.
[ 
Determinants of forecast errors
The cross-sectional determinants of Forecast Errors are investigated using a hierarchical regression. When identifying the explanatory variables, we focused on variables that prior studies show have some predictive power and checked for absence of correlation (correlation matrix in Appendix). The final model considers 6 variables: the logarithm of one plus the age of the firm at the IPO (AGE), the logarithm of sales (SIZE), Net Earnings in the year before listing (NE), leverage at the IPO (LEVERAGE), book-to-market ratio (B2M), and the first-day return (UNDERPRICNG) 18 . The regression model is defined as follows. Table 6 reports estimates of Equation (12) underpricing is a predictor of a higher probability of forecast errors.
As a sensitivity analysis, we include other covariates in the regression. None of these variables have statistical significance. Only the market momentum, measured over the 6 months prior to the listing, is weakly negatively correlated with the 3-year forecast errors (statistical significance 10%).
Forecast Errors and Long Run performance
We examine whether forecast errors are associated with long-term stock returns. The aftermarket performance is measured using Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR), which are calculated for stock i for time period T as follows.
where R i,t is the return of the stock i at time t, and T is the time period for which BHR is determined, and N is the number of stocks in the portfolio. The DJ EURO STOXX index is used as a benchmark 20 . Figure 1 plots the average BHARs over the period of analysis. We find that our sample firms under-perform the benchmark index by about 10% in three years and 5% in five years. However, splitting our sample by year of listing, we find that the long-term performance is affected by the IPO year. In particular, the performance between three and five years after the IPO is very different between IPOs occurring before (1995-1998) and during (1999-2001) the Internet Bubble period.
Companies that went public in the pre-bubble period under-perform the market by around 20%.
Companies that went public during the bubble period perform much better, with no evidence of underperformance.
[
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The cash flows forecast is a major factor in valuing new issues and so errors in these forecasts are expected to be an important determinant of aftermarket stock performance. IPOs whose actual ex-post cash flows exceed their forecasts are likely to experience higher abnormal 20 We exclude the first 21 trading days after the IPO date to avoid a potential bias from the price stabilization of underwriters during that period. To check for the robustness of our results, we also apply the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) with SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low) to capture size and book-to-market characteristics, respectively. We repeated the analysis by employing the local Datastream market indexes. The empirical findings reported here are robust with respect to the index employed.
returns in the years after issue, and those whose FCFFs are less than expected are likely to suffer lower BHARs. We hypothesise that FE will be negatively correlated with BHAR if investors use cash flows forecasts implicit in valuing IPOs. If the forecasts turn out to be erroneous, stock prices should react accordingly. To investigate the relationship between forecast errors and aftermarket performance, we run a regression, whose results are presented in Table 7 . Our main variable of interest, FE, has a negative coefficient in both the 3-year and the 5-year BHAR regressions. This confirms the reaction of the market to the disclosure of cash flows lower than those expected.
We find also a significant negative relation between BHARs and other variables, such as leverage at the IPO (LEVERAGE), market-to-book ratio (inverse of B2M) and underpricing (UNDERPRICING). A negative effect on the post-IPO market performance is also found for firms going public after a period of market extra-returns for the seasoned companies in their sector (SECTOR ER) and for venture-back IPOs (D_VC) 21 . As expected, the Bubble dummy is positive (D_BUBBLE).
Conclusions
IPOs can be valued using a variety of methods, but there will generally be a DCF calculation (Mills, 2005) . This paper studies a sample of 184 European IPOs priced using the DCF model and infers the growth rates implied in offer prices. We find the IPO firms are typically priced on the base of high-growth expectations. The cash flows of the "average" IPO firms are indeed expected to growth by 33% annually over five years. Nevertheless, ex-ante implied growth rates are not sustained by ex-post actual realizations. Actual CAGR of cash flows are indeed much lower than expected. Such over-optimism is measured by comparing the IPO prices to the fair values obtained substituting the actual ex-post cash flows in the DCF model. We find that the median IPO firm is overvalued at the offering by 74%. 21 Our results do not confirm previous US-based findings of venture-backed IPOs outperforming non-venture backed IPOs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 1997) . However, evidence on the performance of venturebacked IPOs in Continental Europe is mixed. Given the relevant differences in the nature of venture capitalists in Europe and in the US, findings on the role of venture capitalists in the US and their influence on the long-run market performance of IPO firms can generally not be transferred to European countries (Hege et al., 2006) . For instance, Rindermann (2004) find that venture-backed IPOs in France, Germany and UK in the period 1996 to 1999 do not outperform those without venture backing. Studying German Neuer Markt IPOs, Kraus and Burghof (2003) find that venture-backed IPOs have an inferior mean abnormal return in comparison to non venture-backed IPOs.
Among the determinants of over-optimism, there are market-to-book ratio, leverage at the IPO, net earnings, underpricing and firm's age and size (these latter negatively related). Firms with high positive difference between market and book value of equity at the IPO are priced on the prospects of growth that are at least partially overestimated. We also find evidence of a negative market reaction to post-IPO disclosure of cash flows lower than expectations.
We expect this research to be of interest for both financial academics and practitioners.
From an academic perspective, this study addresses the issue of over-optimism and provides empirical evidence of it. This paper also contributes to the literature on IPO pricing by proposing a reverse-DCF model to estimate implied expected growth rates. From the perspective of investors, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of the helpfulness and limits of the analysts' forecasts in investment decisions and, more generally, of the determinants of IPO valuations. The ratio between book and market value of equity. Book value is the pre-IPO book value of equity plus the capital inflow at the IPO (primary offer); market value is the number of shares outstanding after the IPO times the offer price. The ratio between the number of newly issued shares and the number of pre-IPO shares.
Appendix. Filters applied to the sample of IPOs and definition of variables
PARTICIPATION
The ratio between the number of existing shares sold by the existing shareholders and the number of pre-IPO shares.
Correlation matrix. Variables definition as follows. Age is measured as calendar year of the IPO minus the calendar year of founding; Sales are relative to the year before listing; Growth is defined as per cent sales growth; Return-On-Assets is operating income over capital invested; Market value is at IPO prices (number of shares outstanding after the IPO times offer price); Size of the offer is number of shares offered (both primary and secondary shares) times offer price; Dilution is the ratio between the number of newly issued shares and the number of pre-IPO shares; Participation is the ratio between the number of existing shares sold by the existing shareholders and the number of pre-IPO shares; Market-to-book is the ratio between book and market value of equity at the IPO; Underpricing is the first day return; Partial adjustment is per cent difference between the offer price and the midpoint of the book-building range; Valuation Uncertainty is defined as the ratio between the book-building price range and the midpoint of the range itself. The table reports the short-term implied growth rate estimated using offer prices. The sample of IPOs is classified by listing year, industry, and stock exchange. Trading months 1999-2001 1995-1998 Full sample
